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At the end of June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (henceforth, the 
'Basel Committee') finally issued the 'New Capital Accord' (henceforth called "Basel II"), 
following endorsement by G10 bank supervisors. This Accord replaces the original accord 
(now termed "Basel I") agreed in July 1988 and implemented by most major banks around 
the  World  since  1993.  Publication  follows  years  of  exhausting  work  by  the  Basel 
Committee to improve upon the original in the light of market developments, advances in 
risk management and revealed deficiencies in the operation of the current scheme (which 
will remain in place until end-2006 for all banks and, for many, very much longer). 
 
  This  article  traces  the  evolution  of  Basel  II  from  its  inception  in  June  1999  to 
agreement on its final form, focussing on the period since the publication of a revised set 
of proposals for a new Accord in January 2001.
1 The impact of the consultation entered 
into with interested parties (there were three formal rounds of consultation) on the final 
shape of the Accord is explored, as is the role played by the Quantitative Impact Studies 
(particularly, "QIS3") in the moulding of Basel II. Finally, the agreed package of proposals 
is assessed from a "cost-benefit" standpoint, and outstanding concerns are identified. In 
particular,  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  Committee  has  done  enough  to  try  and 
ensure that its ultimate objectives are realised is addressed, as is the possibility that it 
overlooked  a  golden  opportunity  to  more  fully  embrace  market  discipline  within  the 
supervisory process. 
                                                 




For  a  number  of  years  now,  the  Basel  Committee  has  been  working  tirelessly  to  get 
agreement  on  a  New  Capital  Accord  to  replace  the  original  agreed  on  by  G10  bank 
supervisors back in July 1988. This quest has been driven by a recognition that the original 
has become superseded by market developments, not least in the area of risk management, 
and that it is failing to operate in the intended fashion because of, for example, "regulatory 
capital arbitrage" (Jones, 2000). The first visible fruits of its labour appeared in June 1999 
in  the  form  of  a  consultative  paper  outlining  proposals  for  reform  of  Basel  I  (Basel 
Committee, 1999). Following consultation with interested parties, a revised set of reform 
proposals was then issued in January 2001 (Basel Committee, 2001a) and, once again, 
these were put forward for consultation. This duly resulted in a third consultation paper 
("CP3") being issued in April 2003 (Basel Committee, 2003a) and it is refinement of this 
document which resulted in the publication of Basel II in June 2004 (Basel Committee, 
2004a). 
 
  Following  a  brief  review  of  the  current  "rules"  applying  under  Basel  I  and  the 
proposals for change outlined by the Basel Committee in June 1999 ("CP1"), as revised by 
its proposals of January 2001 ("CP2"), this article will address in detail developments in 
the run-up to publication of "CP3", the changes introduced under "CP3", and the final 
amendments incorporated in Basel II. A "cost-benefit" analysis of Basel II will then ensue, 
highlighting the outstanding concerns still felt  by many observers. Possible alternative 
approaches to capital adequacy assessment are introduced for comparative purposes and 
the  section  also  explains  how  more  might  have  been  done  to  enhance  the  cost-  4 
effectiveness of the reforms adopted, not least by embracing market discipline more fully 
within the supervisory process. Section 7 summarises and concludes.   5 
SECTION  1  :  A  REVIEW  OF  THE  CURRENT  "RULES"  APPLYING  UNDER 
BASEL I 
 
Since  1  January  1993  internationally-active  banks  incorporated  in  G10  countries  have 
been obliged to comply with a minimum risk asset ratio (RAR) requirement of 8 per cent 
(or  higher,  if  so  demanded  by  their  national  supervisory  authority).  A  bank's  RAR  is 
derived by expressing its 'adjusted capital base' (ACB), comprising allowable "Tier 1" and 
"Tier 2" capital (subject to limits and restrictions), as a percentage of its "total of weighted  
risk assets" (TOWRA). The denominator is, in turn, derived by adding the sum of the risk-
weighted on-balance-sheet items to the sum of risk-weighted off-balance-sheet "credit risk 
equivalents", the latter being derived by multiplying the notional principal exposures by 
the relevant "conversion factors". Using this methodology (see Exhibit 1 for full details), 
regulators have attempted to link a bank's capital to credit  risk-weighted activities, both 
on- and off-balance sheet. Since 1 January 1998,
2 however, in an attempt to accommodate 
banks' market risk exposures (Basel Committee, 1996), the RAR methodology has been 
modified (see Exhibit 2) to take account of both a new source of regulatory capital, "Tier 
3", which is available to meet market risk capital charges subject to limits and restrictions, 
and the market risks to which banks are exposed. The 8 per cent minimum ratio, however, 
remained  as  the  effective  regulatory  floor.  For  those  banks  allowed  by  their  national 
supervisory authorities
3 to use internal models (i.e. VaRs) to calculate their market risk 
capital charges, the market risk capital charge alluded to in Exhibit 2 can be calculated in 
accordance  with  Exhibit 3  as  an  alternative  to  the  "standardised  approach"  (see  Basel 
Committee, 1996). 
                                                 
2 1 January 1996, for EU members because of the adoption of the "Capital Adequacy Directive" (EC, 1993). 
3  The  supervisory  authorities  have  first  to  satisfy  themselves  that  their  banks  comply  with  six  sets  of 
'safeguards' relating to their usage, covering general criteria, qualitative standards, quantitative standards, the 
specification of risk  factors,  stress testing and external  validation of the  models (see Basel Committee, 




THE RISK ASSET RATIO METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED BY 
BANKING REGULATORS UNDER THE G10 CAPITAL ACCORD 
 
 
Under the accord, all internationally-active banks authorised by G10 countries have to observe a minimum 
risk asset ratio (RAR) of 8 per cent. The RAR is calculated as follows: 
   
TOWRA
ACB
RAR(%) =  
where ACB is the adjusted capital base 
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Aij  being the value of the i
th asset with risk weight, Wj, 
Bijk  being the notional principal amount of off-balance-sheet activity i with risk weight Wj and 
  conversion factor Xk, and 
Cijk  being the notional principal amount of the interest or exchange rate related activity i with risk 
weight Wj and conversion factor Xk, 
s  the number of different asset components, 
u   the number of distinct off-balance sheet activities (excluding interest rate and exchange rate related 
activities), 
x  the number of distinct interest and exchange rate related off-balance-sheet instruments, and 
M  the 'mark-to-market' value of the underlying contract. 
 
Where  x < u < s;  v ≤ t = 5;  y ≤ t = 5;  w = 4;  and z = 4. 
 
 
*'Current exposure' assessment method employed. 
 
 
Source:  Hall, 1994. 




THE RISK ASSET RATIO METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED BY G10 
BANKING REGULATORS SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
AMENDED CAPITAL ACCORD ON 1 JANUARY 1998 
 
 
Under the 'Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks' (Basel Committee, 1996), all  
G10-incorporated, internationally-active banks have to observe, continuously, a minimum capital 
requirement derived as follows: 
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(1)  This remains subject to a minimum of 8 per cent. 
(2)  The capital items which may be included in the capital base (CB) are the same as those which were 
eligible for inclusion (subject to limits and deductions) within the capital base under the original 
accord. However, national regulators are empowered to permit banks to adopt an alternative definition 
of capital, subject to limits and restrictions, but only in respect of satisfying the risk-based 
requirements arising from trading-book activities. 
(3)  This now represents the 'total of weighted risk assets' arising from banking book activities only 
(although, note, it covers credit counterparty risk on all over-the-counter derivatives, whether or not 
they are included in the trading book) and is calculated using the general methodological approaches 
set out in Exhibit 1. 




Source:  Hall, 1997.   




THE CALCULATION OF THE CAPITAL CHARGE FOR MARKET RISK 
UNDER THE INTERNAL MODELS APPROACH ALLOWED, 
AT NATIONAL DISCRETION, BY THE BASEL COMMITTEE 
 
 
Under the Basel Committee's internal models approach, banks have to apply the following formula to 
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where    CMRt  =  bank's market risk capital requirement at time t, 
 
    VaRt-1  =  bank's market risk exposure estimate at date t-i, 
 
    SMt  =  supervisory-determined factor [3≤SMt], and 
 




Source:  Kupiec and O'Brien, 1996. 
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As a belated response to criticisms of Basel I – see Exhibit 4 – and in an attempt to catch 
up  with  market  developments  since  1988,  the  Committee  produced  a  set  of  reform 
proposals  in  June  1999.  Its  specific  aims  were  to  improve  the  way  regulatory  capital 
requirements reflect underlying risks, to better address the financial innovation that has 
occurred in recent years and to recognise (and, indeed promote) improvements in bank 
risk management and control that have occurred. The Committee was also keen to adopt a 
more comprehensive approach to addressing risks by, for example, embracing additional 
risks such as operational risk. 
 
  Under the new framework, three mutually reinforcing supervisory "pillars" were to be 
used,  with  a  "supervisory  review"  of  an  institution's  capital  adequacy  and  internal 
assessment  process  and  greater  "market  discipline"  (to  be  effected  through  enhanced 
information  disclosure)  operating  alongside  the  traditional  minimum  regulatory  capital 
requirements.  The  last-mentioned,  however,  would  now  be  based  upon  external  credit 
assessments provided by rating agencies rather than the, fairly arbitrary, risk weights and 
conversion factors previously supplied by the Committee, and further thought would be 
given to allowing sophisticated banks to use internal credit ratings and, possibly, at some 
future date, portfolio credit risk models to set capital charges. These and the other changes 
proposed are summarised in more detail in Exhibit 5; and a cost-benefit style of analysis of 




DEFICIENCIES IN THE BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD OF 1988: 
SOME OTPIONS FOR REFORM 
 
 
DEFICIENCIES  REFORM OPTIONS 
   
 1.  The agreement is not legally binding, undermining its 
effectiveness.  
 1.  Transform the agreed guidelines into legally-binding rules 
(as in the EU). 
  [This would require moving the debate into another forum 
such as the OECD or the WTO.] 
 2.  The geographical coverage achieved is limited, under-
mining stability of the international banking system. 
 2.  Widen the coverage achieved by promoting the associated 
benefits more widely and/or by moving the discussions to an 
alternative forum such as the OECD or the WTO. 
 3.  The use of a flawed methodology in the credit risk 
assessment process. 
 3.  Change the basis of risk assessment. 
  [Possible alternatives include: the use of a portfolio 
approach (such as that used by the SFA in the UK); the use 
of options pricing theory; the use of multi-variate 
discriminant analysis; the use of computerised "contingency 
testing".] 
 4.  The use of "inexact" (in an actuarial sense) risk weights and 
conversion factors in the weighting system. 
 4.  (i) Revise the calculus more frequently to reflect up-dated 
analysis of historical loss evidence. 
  (ii) Encapsulate additional (i.e. non-credit) risks within the 
risk measures. 
  (iii) Change the basis of risk assessment. 
 5.  Induces a misallocation of capital resources within the 
banking industry. 
 5.  (i) Change the basis of risk assessment. 
  (ii) Stress the importance of banks taking other factors into 
account when allocating capital. 
 6.  Induces a misallocation of capital resources between the 
bank and non-bank sectors of the economy. 
 6.  Change the basis of risk assessment and the overall capital 
requirements. 
 7.  Induces distortion in banks' pricing and other business 
decisions. 
 7.  (i) Change the basis of risk assessment and the overall 
capital requirements. 
  (ii) Revise the calculus of risk weights and conversion 
factors. 
  (iii) Impress upon banks the importance of considering other 
factors before making such decisions. 
 8.  Leads to a misallocation of resources due to the induced 
balance sheet restructuring by banks. 
 8.  (i) Change the basis of risk assessment. 
  (ii) Revise the calculus of risk weights and conversion 
factors. 
 9.  May breed complacency. 
  [Strict adherence to the guidelines by all internationally-
active banks would still not guarantee their solvency nor the 
stability of the international financial system.] 
 9.  Impress upon banks and their supervisors the limitations of 
the agreement as a device for ensuring the continued 
solvency of individual banks. 
  [The significance of complementary devices – especially 
those designed to assist in the detection and prevention of 
fraud – should be highlighted.] 
10.  Not enough done to level the playing field for international 
banks.. 
10.  (i) Narrow the scope for national discretion. 
  (ii) Widen the geographical coverage achieved. 
11.  Risks contributing to global and/or regional "credit 
crunches". 
11.  Consider relaxation of the "rules" on a "case-by-case" basis 
at the G10 level. 
12.  May induce perverse and potentially destabilising responses 
on the part of banks. 




Source: Derived from Hall, 1989 and 1994. 




SUMMARY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S PROPOSALS OF JUNE 1999 





•  to continue to promote safety and soundness in the financial system 
•  to continue to enhance competitive equality 
•  to adopt a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks 
•  to continue to focus on internationally-active banks, although the new framework's underlying 
principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication 
 
Aims of the Review 
 
•  to improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks 
•  to better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years 
•  to recognise the improvements in risk measurement and control that have occurred 
•  longer term, to introduce a framework that is flexible, more accurately reflects the risks to which banks 
are exposed, and is responsive to financial innovation and developments in risk management practices 
 
Components of the New Framework 
 
The three "pillars": 
•  minimum regulatory capital requirements 
•  supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and internal assessment process 
•  greater market discipline 
 
The first pillar : minimum regulatory capital requirements 
•  the vast majority of banks to continue to use a "standardised" approach based upon the current Accord, 
but amended to allow for: 
  -  widescale usage of external credit assessments to determine the appropriate risk weights (see table 
below) 
  -  the introduction of a new risk bucket (150%) for certain low quality exposures 
  -  the introduction of a new risk weighting scheme to address asset securitisation 
  -  the application of a 20% credit conversion factor for certain types of short-term commitments 
  -  abolition of the 50% cap on the risk weighting of certain derivative exposures 
  -  wider supervisory recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques 
  -  extension of the accord to cover interest rate risk in the banking book and "other" risks, such as 
operational risk 
  -  extension of the principle of full consolidation to embrace holding company parents of banking 
groups 
•  more sophisticated banks being allowed to use internal ratings (and, possibly, portfolio credit risk 
models, at some future date) to set capital charges, although this would be subject to supervisory 
approval and adherence to quantitative and qualitative guidelines. 
 
continued … 
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Proposed New Risk Weightings 
Claim  Assessment
1 






BB+ to B-  Below B-  Unrated 
Sovereigns
2    0%  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
Banks
3  Option 1
4  20%  50%  100%  100%  150%  100% 
  Option 2
5  20%  50%
6  50%
6  100%
6  150%  50%
6 
Corporates    20%
7  100%  100%  100%  150%  100% 
Securitsations











1.  Assessments are based on Standard & Poor's ratings by way of example only – other equivalent assessments of eligible external 
agencies could be used. 
2.  Includes central banks. Modified treatment available for domestic currency exposures. 
3.  Claims on multilateral development banks would be weighted 20%. Claims on public sector entities would generally be treated in 
the same way as a claim on a bank in the same country. 
4.  Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated. 
5.  Risk weighting based on assessment of individual bank but weighting could not be lower than that applied to the country of the 
bank's incorporation. 
6.  Claims on banks of a short original maturity, for example less than six months, would receive a weighting that is one category 
more favourable than the usual risk weight on the bank's claims. 
7.  Risk weighting could not be lower than that applied to the country of the corporate's incorporation. 
8.  Supervisors may also impose a 20% risk weighted capital charge on originating banks in the case of revolving facilities when 
uncontrolled early amortisation or master trust agreements may pose special problems for the originating bank. 
Source:  O'Neill, 1999 (derived from Basel Committee, 1999). 
 
The second pillar : supervisory review of capital adequacy 
•  early supervisory intervention encouraged 
•  supervisors to be required to set bank-specific capital charges that reflect each bank's particular risk 
profile and control environment, and which may exceed the minimum capital ratio standard (currently, 
8% on a RAR basis – see Exhibit 1) 
•  supervisory review to cover, inter alia, banks' internal capital assessment processes and control 
environments 
 
The third pillar : greater market discipline 
•  to be achieved through enhanced information disclosure covering, inter alia: 
  -  capital structure, including information on (i) amounts of Tier 1, Tier 2, and (if applicable) Tier 3 
capital held; (ii) accounting policies, especially policies adopted in respect of the valuation of assets 
and liabilities, provisioning, and income recognition; (iii) components of capital and the terms and 
main features of capital instruments, especially in the case of innovative, complex and hybrid 
capital instruments; (iv) reserves set aside for credit losses and other potential losses; (v) any 
conditions that may merit special attention in an analysis of the strength of a bank's capital, 
including, maturity, level of seniority, step-up provisions, interest or dividend deferrals, use of 
Special Purpose Vehicles, and terms of derivatives embedded in hybrid capital instruments. 
  -  risk exposures. Qualitative (e.g. management strategies) and quantitative (e.g. position data) 
information needs to be disclosed in a manner which facilitates objective assessment of the nature 
and magnitude of the risk exposures run by banks. 
  -  capital adequacy, including disclosure of risk-based capital ratios calculated in accordance with the 
prescribed methodology, and qualitative disclosures about the internal processes used for 
evaluating capital adequacy. 
•  more detailed guidance was promised during 1999 by the Basel Committee. (It actually materialised in 
January 2000  - see Basel Committee, 2000.) 
 
Timetable for Action 
•  comments from interested parties must be received by 31 March 2000 
•  more definitive proposals were promised by the end of year 2000. (They actually emerged in January 
2001 – see Basel Committee, 2001a.) 
 
Source:  Hall, 2001a. 




AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S PROPOSALS OF JUNE 1999 
 
 
A.  Positive Features 
 
1.  Would increase stability of the internationalised banking system. 
  [This would result from: the attempts made to minimise the "perverse" incentives facing banks; the 
focus on other bank risks; the new obligations placed on supervisors to engage in "prompt corrective 
action" and to impose bank-specific capital charges that closely reflect the risk exposures actually 
assumed; the consolidation of parent holding companies; the linking of the benefits to be derived, in the 
form of reduced risk weightings (i.e. below 100%), by highly-rated banks to their supervisors' adoption 
of the Basel Committee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision"; the encouragement 
given, via wider supervisory recognition, to the development of risk mitigation techniques; the reduction 
of the bias in favour of short-term interbank lending, the introduction of a higher (i.e. 150%) risk weight 
for lowly-rated (i.e. below "B-" borrowers; the abolition of the 50% cap on the risk-weighting of 
derivative exposures; the incentives provided to all borrowers (bar some of those currently unrated) to 
seek higher credit ratings; the demand for greater information disclosure; and the new requirement for 
supervisors to take explicit account of an individual bank's relative importance in national and 
international markets and potential to trigger systemic instability.] 
2.  Would increase economic efficiency. 
  [This would result from: the use of external credit ratings, which take account of, inter alia, the 
characteristics of the obligor, to determine risk weights; possible supervisory recognition of internal 
credit ratings and portfolio credit risk models, which would align regulatory capital requirements more 
closely with the internal allocation of economic capital; the removal of the bias in favour of loans to 
OECD countries and OECD banks; the reduction in the bias in favour of short-term (i.e. for less than 
365 days) interbank lending; the removal of the bias in favour of off-balance-sheet (rather than on-
balance-sheet) exposures via abolition of the 50% cap on the risk weighting of derivative exposures; the 
removal of the bias in favour of commitments of up to one year; the introduction of a 150% risk weight 
for lowly-rated borrowers; the linking of the benefits gained by highly-rated sovereign borrowers (from 
reduced risk weights, i.e. below 100%) to the country's compliance with the IMF's "Special Data-
Dissemination Standards"; the attempts to block the use of securitisation as a means of circumventing 
capital requirements through the risk-weighting of securitisation tranches; the incentives created for all 
borrowers (other than some of those currently unrated) to seek improved ratings; the encouragement 
given to the continued development of sophisticated risk management techniques and their closer 
integration with capital allocation procedures; the enhanced information disclosure requirements, which 
will lead to improved market transparency and greater market discipline.] 
3.  Would contribute, on balance, to a further levelling of the regulatory playing field. 
  [This would result from: the enforced geographical spread of prompt corrective action and the 
application of bank-specific capital charges; convergence in information disclosure standards and 
supervisory practices; removal of the bias resulting from OECD membership/incorporation.] 
 
B.  Concerns 
 
1.  Too much power being vested in the hands of far from infallible rating agencies? 
  [Anxieties relate to: the previous track record of the rating agencies, especially in respect of their 
'performance' in the recent Asian crisis; the degree of concentration in the industry (currently there are 
only three main players, Moody's Investors Service, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch IBCA); the 
commercial and political pressures they would face in the new environment; their potential to act in a 
destabilising fashion; the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.] 
2.  Perverse incentives also exist in the proposed new framework. 
  [For example: those sovereigns, banks and corporates currently without a rating and fearful of being 
awarded a rating of below "B-" have a positive disincentive to seek a rating as they would end up being 
worse off if their fears were realised (because unrated borrowers typically incur a 100% risk weight 
whereas those rated below "B-" incur a 150% risk weight); because of the uneven distribution of risk 
weights on securitisation tranches, banks would still have a strong incentive to securitise their high 
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  quality loans, thereby reducing the quality of the remaining loan portfolios, given the failure to 
differentiate adequately between corporate borrowers (those with a rating of between "A+" and "B-" all 
incur the same risk weighting of 100%), as under the current accord banks have an incentive to court 
high risk corporate borrowers if they believe they can extract sufficiently high loan charges to more than 
offset the increased risk of default; this is also true, but to a more limited degree, for loans to banks 
(under either option) and, given the impracticality of differentiating between personal loan customers 
for regulatory purposes, for loans to individuals.] 
3.  Similarly, inexplicable anomalies also feature in the proposed new framework. 
  [For example: it is not clear why sovereign borrowers are generally favoured by the proposed risk 
weight framework, while little differentiation is made in respect of corporates and, to a lesser degree, 
between banks (under either option), factors which reduce incentives to seek higher ratings; if "Option 
2" is adopted in respect of the treatment of bank claims (which involves risk weighting banks on the 
basis of their individual characteristics but improving, by one category, the risk weighting for claims 
with an original maturity of less than six months), interbank lending might become even more skewed 
towards shorter maturities than at present.] 
4.  The imposition of additional flat rate capital charges to cover 'other' risks, such as operational risks, is 
ill-conceived. 
5.  As the Committee acknowledges, insufficient attention has been paid to the maturity of claims in the 
promulgation of risk weights, militating against accurate assessment of underlying risks. 
6.  The scope for 'national discretion' is still too great, militating against a levelling of the playing field. 
  [New areas for discretion relate to: the determination of the weighting of local currency-denominated 
sovereign debt; and identification and treatment of those banks with "excessive" interest rate risk in their 
banking books.] 
  A ratings-based framework also discriminates against institutions in those countries which, traditionally, 
have not sponsored a ratings culture (e.g. Germany). 
7.  The proposals imply a significant (and possibly untenable) increase in the burden placed on most 
supervisory authorities as a result of: the new requirements relating to the adoption of prompt corrective 
action and the application of bank-specific capital charges, subject to the minimum capital ratio; the 
requirement for a more extensive supervisory review, including an assessment of all internal control 
processes and systems relating to capital and risk management; and the burden associated with 
approving and monitoring banks' internal credit rating systems and, further down the road, their 
portfolio credit risk models. 
8.  Although the proposals offer the prospect of reduced compliance costs for some (i.e. the small group of 
highly-sophisticated, global players), as a result of the closer alignment of regulatory requirements with 
the internal procedures adopted to allocate economic capital, most banks are likely to face higher costs 
following the adoption of the complete package of reforms, not least because of the demands for 
increased information disclosure. 
9.  In respect of the treatment of bank claims, adoption of "Option 1", by ignoring the banks' individual 
characteristics, would penalise sound, well-managed banks through no fault of their own; yet adoption 
of "Option 2", while being more equitable, would, as noted earlier, accentuate the trend towards ever-
shortening maturities for interbank loans. 
10.  Although the introduction of prompt corrective action has been widely promoted in many countries (e.g. 
the USA and Japan) as a device for limiting supervisory "forbearance", poor design and injudicious use 
of the policy instrument could, potentially, be destabilising. 
11.  In so far as the standardised approach, which the vast majority of the banks would still adopt, would still 
treat credit risks as being additive (as in the current risk asset ratio methodology), the basic flaw in the 
risk assessment methodology would remain, notwithstanding the greater supervisory recognition of risk 
mitigation techniques. 
12.  Finally, the Committee's desire to at least maintain the current overall level of capital within the 
international banking system should be predicated upon its ability to demonstrate that the fragility of the 
system warrants this; otherwise, what is the point in refining credit risk assessment, and linking capital 
requirements more closely to the "true" (in an actuarial sense) level of risk run by individual banks? 
 
Source:  Hall, 2001a. 
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SECTION 3 : REVISIONS TO THE JUNE 1999 PROPOSALS SUGGESTED IN 




In  the  light  of  the  feedback  received  during  the  round  of  consultation  following 
publication of its June 1999 paper (which became known as "Consultation Paper 1", i.e. 
"CP1") and to accommodate developmental work undertaken since that date, a revised set 
of proposals ("CP2") duly appeared in January 2001. The three-pillared approach was 
confirmed although proposals on each front were refined and extended. In connection with 
Pillar 1 (i.e. minimum regulatory capital requirements), a more risk-sensitive framework 
was  proposed  for  the  "standardised  approach",  but  still  embracing  the  use  of  external 
credit assessments and, with respect to sovereign exposures, the use of published country 
risk scores of export credit agencies – see Exhibit 7. For more complex banks, an "internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach" would be available, at national discretion, providing the 
banks' risk management capabilities satisfied rigorous supervisory standards. Qualifying 
banks would be able to choose between a "foundation" IRB approach and an "advanced" 
IRB approach, depending on their ability to comply with demanding sets of supervisory 
standards.
4 An explicit capital charge to cover operational risk was also promised, and a 
new treatment recognising credit risk mitigation techniques was proposed. These changes 
to CP1, together with those proposed for Pillars 2 and 3, are summarised in Exhibit 8, 
which also sets out the work still to be done by the Committee and the planned timetable 
for action. 
 
                                                 
4 Under the IRB approaches, supervisory formulae (see Fabi et al., 2004, for an excellent explanation of the 
methodology adopted) link minimum capital requirements to the probability of default (PD), loss given 
default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity (M). Generally, for the foundation IRB 
approach,  banks  must  use  their  own  estimates  for  PD's  but  supervisory  estimates  for  the  other  three 
parameters (unless national supervisors require banks to use their own estimates for M). In contrast, under 
the advanced IRB approach, banks may use their own estimates for PD's, LGD's and EAD's and must use 
their own estimates for the M's.   16 
  In general, the changes proposed in January 2001 reflected the Committee's greater 
emphasis than hitherto on providing banks and their supervisors with a range of options 
for  the  assessment  of  capital  adequacy,  in  an  attempt  to  move  further  away  from 
prescription and a "one size fits all" policy. A greater willingness to allow banks to deploy 
their  own  assessments  of  the  risks  to  which  they  are  exposed  in  the  calculation  of 
minimum regulatory capital charges is also evident in their proposals for the use of the 




THE JANUARY 2001 PROPOSALS FOR THE RISK WEIGHTING OF 




Table 1 : Claims on Sovereigns
(1) 
 
If banks use the credit assessments of eligible
(2) external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs), the 








A+ to A-  BB+ to 
BBB- 
BB+ to B-  Below 
B- 
Unrated 
             
Risk Weights  0%  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
 
 
If banks, instead, use the country risk scores of "qualifying"
(5) Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), the following 
risk weights are to be applied. 
 
ECA risk scores  0-1  2  3  4 to 6  7 
           




(1)  To include central banks and public sector entities treated as sovereign. 
(2)  As defined in Basel Committee, 2001a, Section A2, pp.12-13. 
(3)  At national discretion, a lower risk weight may be applied to banks' exposures to sovereigns where they 
are denominated in domestic currency and funded in that currency. The lower risk weight may also be 
extended to the risk weighting of collateral and guarantees. 
(4)  The notation follows that used by Standard & Poor's. 
(5)  To qualify, an ECA must public its risk scores and subscribe to the OECD 1999 methodology. 
 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2001a, pp.7-8. 
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Table 2 : Claims on Banks
(1) (and Securities Firms Subject to Comparable Regulatory and 
       Supervisory Arrangements) 
 
 








A+ to A-  BBB+ to  
BBB- 
BB+ to B-  Below  
B- 
Unrated 
             
Risk Weights  20%  50%  100%  100%  150%  100% 
 
 








A+ to A-  BBB+ to 
 BBB- 






















20%  20%  20%  50%  150%  20% 
 
Notes: 
(1)  National supervisors must choose and apply one option to all banks in their jurisdiction. No claim on an 
unrated bank may receive a risk weight less than that applied to its sovereign incorporation. 
(2)  Under this option, all banks in a given country are to be assigned a risk weight one category less 
favourable than that assigned to claims on the sovereign of incorporation. However, for claims on banks 
in sovereigns rated BB+ to B- and on banks in unrated countries, the risk weight may be capped at 
100%. 
(3)  At national discretion, a lower risk weight (subject to a floor of 20%) can be assigned to such exposures 
where the claims are of an original maturity of 3 months or less and are denominated and funded in the 
domestic currency. This also applies in Option 2. 
(4)  Under this option, a preferential risk weight that is one category more favourable than the risk weight 
shown may be applied to short-term claims, subject to a floor of 20%. This treatment is available to both 
rated and unrated claims, but not to banks risk weighted at 150%. 
(5)  Defined as having an original maturity of 3 months or less. 
 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2001a, pp.9-10. 
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Risk Weight  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
 
Notes: 
(1)  No claim on an unrated corporate may be given a risk weight preferential to that assigned to its 
sovereign of incorporation. And in countries where corporates have higher default rates, supervisors 
should increase the standard risk weight for unrated claims where they judge that a higher risk weight is 
warranted by the overall default experience in their jurisdiction. As part of their review process, 
supervisors should also consider whether the credit quality of corporate claims held by individual banks 
should warrant a standard risk weight higher than100%. 
 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2001a, p.10. 




SUMMARY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S PROPOSALS 
OF JANUARY 2001 FOR A NEW CAPITAL ACCORD 
 
 
Confirmation/Clarification of June 1999 Proposals 
•  Aims/objectives remain the same except that greater emphasis is now placed on providing banks and 
their supervisors with a range of options for the assessment of capital adequacy. 
•  The scope of the revised accord is to be extended on a consolidated basis to parent holding companies of 
banking groups, and will apply on a sub-consolidated basis to all internationally-active banks at every 
tier below group level. 
•  The new approach is to be based on the three mutually reinforcing pillars previously outlined namely, 
minimum regulatory capital requirements, supervisory review (of an institution's capital adequacy and 
internal assessment process), and greater market discipline (to be achieved through enhanced 
information disclosure). 
•  Within Pillar 1, a "standardised approach", building upon the 1988 accord but embracing external credit 
assessments, will be available for "less complex" banks; an "internal ratings-based approach" will be 
available, at national discretion (supervisory approval will depend on, inter alia, the local financial, 
accounting, legal, supervisory and market environment), to banks with more advanced risk management 
capabilities which satisfy rigorous supervisory standards. The use of portfolio credit risk models is still 
envisaged as a possible future option.
(1) An explicit capital charge to cover operational risk will also be 
introduced. Finally, a (new) set of proposals, will provide capital reductions for various forms of credit 
risk mitigation techniques that serve to reduce risk. However, they will only be available to banks 
meeting minimum operational standards (in recognition of the fact that poor management of operational 
risks, including legal risks, can render such mitigants of little or no value). Moreover, although partial 
mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual risks (see Basel 
Committee, 2001b, and 2001c). 
•  Under Pillar 2, a (revised and extended) set of procedures has been proposed whereby supervisors seek 
to ensure that each bank has sound internal processes in place to allow it to assess the adequacy of its 
capital and to set targets for capital that are commensurate with the bank's specific risk profile and 
control environment. This internal process is then subject to supervisory review and intervention where 
appropriate, supervisors drawing on, inter alia, their knowledge of best practice across institutions and 
the minimum criteria attached to the various approaches available for regulatory capital assessment. 
Interest rate risk in the banking book (and 'other' risks) are to be treated under Pillar 2, in accordance 
with a revised set of principles (see Basel Committee, 2001d). 
•  Under Pillar 3, a (new and extended) set of disclosure requirements and recommendations have been set 
out to allow market participants to assess critical information describing the risk profile and capital 
adequacy of banks. 
 
Main Changes/Developments Since June 1999 
In Pillar 1: 
•  Under the standardised approach, a more risk-sensitive approach, but still embracing the use of external 
credit assessments, is proposed. 
  For banks' exposures to sovereigns (i.e. governments, central banks and PSEs treated as such by national 
supervisors), the use of published credit scores of export credit agencies is sanctioned along with the use 
of other external credit assessments. The definition of a 'short term inter-bank loan' has been redefined 
to include only those with an original maturity of at least 3 months (not 6 months, as previously 
proposed). A new treatment of asset securitisation, embracing both a standardised and internal ratings-
based approaches, has been proposed for further consultation (see Basel Committee, 2001e); and a 
revised treatment of credit risk mitigation is proposed. The Committee has dropped its previous 
proposal for a "sovereign floor" to risk weights on bank and corporate exposures, whereby such risk 
weights could never be below those applied to the sovereign of corporation. However, although 
exposures to banks and corporates that have external credit assessments higher than those of their 
sovereigns may now enjoy preferential risk weights, these will not be permitted to fall below 20%. 
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  Finally, the Committee has dropped its proposal that the availability of preferential risk weights in the 
standardised approach is conditional on adherence to the IMF's "Special Data Dissemination Standards", 
the Basel Committee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision", or IOSCO's "Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation". The decision was taken in the light of the fact that judgements 
regarding compliance with such standards would in large part be qualitative; moreover, the Committee 
did not want such assessments to be taken in a mechanical fashion. 
•  As noted above, internal ratings-based (IRB) systems will now be available, on a much wider basis than 
originally intended, to qualifying banks with more advanced risk management capabilities. Banks will 
be able to choose between a "foundation" approach and a more complicated "advanced" approach, 
depending upon their ability to comply with demanding sets of supervisory standards. 
In Pillar 2: 
•  A revised and extended set of proposals covering the supervisory review process has been published 
based on the establishment of four "key principles of supervisory review" (see Basel Committee, 2001f). 
In Pillar 3: 
•  More detailed guidance, distinguishing between "requirements" and "strong recommendations", has now 
been produced covering information disclosure on capital structure, risk exposures and capital adequacy 
(see Basel Committee, 2001g). 
•  Separate disclosure requirements have been put forth as prerequisites for supervisory recognition of 
internal methodologies for credit risk, credit risk mitigation techniques and asset securitisation [and, in 
the future, for advanced approaches to operational risk]. 
 
Issues Still to be Resolved/Work On-going 
•  The treatment of asset securitisations 
  Although the Committee has developed for consultation standardised and IRB approaches for treating 
the explicit risks facing banks in traditional securitisations (see Basel Committee, 2001e, for a full 
discussion of the operational, disclosure and minimum capital requirements proposal), it has also 
identified a limited number of issues requiring additional work, which may result in changes to the 
proposed treatment of asset securitisation. These issues relate to: 
  -  synthetic securitisation transactions (i.e. those involving portfolio credit derivatives) 
  -  how to attain greater risk-sensitivity under the foundation and advanced IRB approaches 
  -  how to attain the appropriate degree of economic consistency between the IRB treatment of 
securitisation and various forms of credit risk mitigation 
  -  the treatment of implicit and residual risks 
•  The treatment of operational risk 
  On-going consultation with the industry is taking place with a view to establishing an accurate 
calibration of the related minimum capital requirements. The Committee is also calling for a co-
ordinated, industry-wide collection and sharing of data based on consistent definitions of loss, risks and 
business lines to help it develop the advanced approaches to operational risk. 
•  Assessing the potential impact of provisioning practices on capital adequacy 
  The Committee is currently contemplating doing some work on methods for addressing losses that are 
expected but have not yet materialised. 
•  The development of the IRB approach 
  Although the Committee has proposed an IRB treatment for six broad exposure classes, its work on 
corporate, bank and sovereign exposures (which are treated in a broadly similar fashion) is most 
developed. Accordingly, its proposals for retail exposures are still being refined (e.g. should it cover 
loans to small businesses or not?), while its preliminary work on project finance and equity exposures 
will be continued during the consultation period. 
  The Committee is also considering incorporating maturity as an explicit risk driver under the IRB 
approach; and is seeking comment on its proposal to include an explicit maturity adjustment under the 
advance IRB approach. 
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  Finally, the Committee is considering the application of the IRB approach to credit risk in the trading 
book, and the treatment of potential future exposure of over-the-counter derivative instruments. 
•  The development of the advanced IRB approach 
  The Committee has made it clear that its proposals are only a starting point for discussion, with 
emphasis on ensuring that the regulatory capital will cover the underlying risks with a high degree of  
confidence. The tentative risk weights put forward are based on a calibration that would produce a 
capital requirement of 8% for an asset with a 0.7% probability of default, a 50% loss given default, and 
a three-year maturity. The Committee will provide a revised calibration in its final proposals reflecting 
further consultation with the industry and its on-going work in this area. 
  The Committee also wants to provide banks with a modest incentive (by way of reduced capital 
charges) to adopt more sophisticated risk management methods, although it is not sure what this should 
be in order to induce greater take-up of the advanced (rather than foundation) IRB approach. During the 
first two years following the date of implementation (i.e. until some date in the year 2008), the 
Committee is proposing a floor on the advanced IRB approach equal to 90% of the capital requirements 
which would result under (a simplified calculation of) the foundation IRB approach. During this two-
year period, the Committee will review the results of the capital requirements calibrated under the 
advanced approach. The Committee also notes that the substantial risk sensitivity of the IRB approaches 
could imply changes over time in the capital required for particular assets as their quality varies over the 
course of the economic cycle. They thus ask banks to perform relevant stress tasks and establish 
additional capital cushions during periods of economic growth. 
•  The mapping of external credit assessments to the standardised risk buckets 
  During the consultation period, the Committee has promised to develop guiding principles for the 
mapping of external credit assessments provided by export credit agencies (ECAs) and external credit 
assessment institutions (ECAIs) to the standardised risk buckets. The Committee will also continue its 
work on the use of short-term assessments for risk weighting purposes. 
•  The development of the Committee's information disclosure requirements and recommendations 
  The Committee has invited comment on the relevance, appropriateness and level of detail set out in its 
documents, particularly in the IRB areas, and on how the disclosures might be streamlined. It will also 
continue to work with the accounting authorities, including the International Accounting Standards 
Committee, to promote consistency between disclosure frameworks. 
  The Committee is clarifying the concepts used in defining the trading book to ensure that positions 
which should be in the banking book are not inappropriately assigned to the trading book. It has also 
provided guidance on the prudent valuation of positions in the trading book, and made changes to the 
specific risk capital treatments applicable under the standardised methodology to the trading book 
consistent with the changes made in the banking book capital requirements under the standardised 
approach. 
 
Timetable for Implementation 
•  Comments on the January 2001 consultation document (and supporting documents) have to be received 
by the Committee by end-May 2001. 
•  A final, definitive version of the new capital accord is promised by end-2001 (later revised to end-2003 
and then to mid-2004). 
•  Internationally-active banks in member jurisdictions are required to implement the proposals during the 
year 2004 (later revised to 2007). It is hoped that, eventually, all "significant" banks will comply with 
the new "rules". 
•  In those jurisdictions where it proves impossible to fully implement all of the three pillar requirements, 
supervisors should, at the minimum, implement Pillar 1; more intensive use of another pillar should 
also, where possible, compensate for non-compliance with the remaining pillar. 
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•  A set of transitional arrangements will also apply, embracing the following: 
  -  countries unable to initially comply with the consolidation/sub-consolidation requirements will be 
given three years from the date of implementation of the new accord to fall into line. 
  -  for those banks contemplating adoption of the IRB approaches, the Committee is currently 
considering, for corporate, banking and sovereign exposures under the foundation IRB approach, as 
well as for retail exposures, granting a three-year transition period during which data-related 
minimum requirements would be relaxed – subject to supervisors ensuring that implementation of the 
IRB approaches is done in a sound manner during this period. Banks availing themselves of these 
arrangements, however, must make appropriate disclosure, covering the nature and extent of their 




(1)  While concerns about data validation of model outputs currently rule out supervisory recognition of 
portfolio credit risk models, the Committee believes that those deficiencies can be overcome in the 
context of an IRB approach through the development of rigorous minimum requirements that banks 
must meet in establishing the inputs and outputs of their internal rating systems, and by ruling out at this 
stage banks' own assessments of portfolio effects such as concentration and diversification. 
 
 
Source:  Hall, 2001a. 
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SECTION  4  :  DEVELOPMENTS  POST-"CP2"  IN  THE  RUN-UP  TO 





4.1   Developments Pre-"CP3" 
 
 
As foreshadowed at the time of publication of CP2, work proceeded apace on a number of 
fronts. A new Working Paper on operational risk was issued in September 2001, refining 
the definition of operational risk and presaging a future recalibration of the associated 
capital charge (the proximate "target" for the minimum capital charge was also cut from 
the initially proposed 20 per cent of total regulatory capital to 12 per cent). And, in respect 
of disclosure requirements, a new Working Paper on market discipline was also released 
in  September  2001  proposing  a  number  of  changes  to  required  disclosures  with  the 
intention of reducing the overall burden placed on banks (although the Committee also 
suggested that the proposed streamlined disclosures become "requirements" rather than 
"recommendations"). As regards the treatment of credit risk mitigation, the Committee 
announced the same month that it would drop the idea of applying a "w factor" to account 
for residual risks, although these will now have to be addressed under Pillar 2. 
 
  Two  further  Working  Papers  were  released  in  October  2001.  The  first  set  out  a 
modified IRB approach for the treatment of specialised lending. The second, on asset 
securitisation, established the eligibility conditions for the treatment of securitised assets 
under the IRB approach. 
 
  The  first  major  initiative  taken  in  2002,  following  pressure  from  the  German 
government  and  other  interested  parties,  was  to  reduce  the  required  capital  charges 
associated with loans to SMEs (confirmed in July 2002). [This issue is addressed in more   25 
detail  in  Fabi  et  al.,  2004.]  This  was  followed,  in  October    2002,  by  the  Committee 
producing another revised set of proposals and launching the third and final 'Quantitative 
Impact Study' ("QIS3") to assess the likely effects of the revised package on the minimum 
capital  requirements  of  banks  worldwide.  The  latest  revisions  involved  the  following 
refinements to Pillar 1 capital charges for retail exposures (for full details see Jackson, 
2002,  and  Fabi  et  al.,  2004):  under  the  standardised  approach,  the  risk  weights  for 
residential mortgages and other retail exposures were reduced to 40 per cent (from 50 per 
cent) and 75 per cent (from 100 per cent) respectively; and, under the IRB approaches, 
flatter risk weight curves (i.e. showing risk weights rising less steeply with increases in the 
probability of default) for corporate  and SME  exposures were produced to reflect the 
findings from an earlier quantitative impact study (Basel Committee, 2001h) that capital 
requirements  in  these  areas  were  generally  too  high.  Some  attempt  was  also  made  to 
address the concerns over "procyclicality" (banks using IRB approaches must now use a 
time horizon of more than one  year when assigning ratings, and must also use stress 
testing or otherwise take account of borrowers' characteristics rendering them vulnerable 
to  adverse  economic  conditions).  As  noted  earlier,  the  target  amount  of  capital  to  be 
delivered by the operational risk charge was also cut from 20 per cent of the overall 
requirement  arising  under  the  current  accord  to  12  per  cent,  or  even  less.  A  new 
"advanced" approach (the 'Advanced Measurement Approach' – AMA) to the calculation 
of the operational risk capital charge was also introduced, as agreed in July 2002, which 
allows banks greater flexibility in the choice of assessment methodology and is no longer 
subject to a capital floor requirement. And, finally, the minimum standards required of 
banks seeking to use the IRB approaches were redrafted to try to ensure that they result in 
consistent  measures  of  internal  estimates  across  institutions  while  also  allowing  for 
differences in the way banking organisations work.   26 
 
  The  results  of  QIS3  were  published  in  May  2003  (Basel  Committee,  2003a).  As 
explained in Exhibit 9, considerable variability in the impact of the latest set of proposals 
on  individual  banks  and  groups  of  banks  is  evident.  With  respect  to  the  standardised 
approach, all groups of participant banks experienced average increases in overall capital 
requirements compared with current requirements, with small banks in the EU and G10 
faring the best. The driving force behind this result was the introduction of a new capital 
charge for operational risk which more than offset the relief experienced with respect to 
retail and SME portfolios. In respect of the foundation IRB approach, the biggest 'winners' 
were again the small banks in the G10 and EU who achieved average reductions in overall 
capital charges of 19 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. Finally, the results indicated 
that the best option for large banks in both the EU and G10 was to adopt the advanced IRB 
approach,  which  yielded  average  capital  reductions  of  6  per  cent  and  2  per  cent 
respectively on current levels. 
 
  In the light of these results, the Committee decided to make a number of changes to its 
Pillar  1  requirements  in  order  to  secure  the  right  incentive  effects,  and  these  are 




RESULTS OF THE THIRD QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY ("QIS3") 




A total of 365 banks from 43 different countries participated in the study, yielding the following results: 
 
•  With respect to the standardised approach, all groups of banks (comprising 'large' G10 banks, 'small' 
G10 banks, 'large' EU banks, 'small' EU banks, and 'other' banks) experienced average increases in capital 
requirements relative to current requirements, ranging from 12% for 'other' banks to 1% for small (i.e. 
'Group 2') EU banks – see Table A below. 
 










  Av.  Max.  Min.  Av.  Max.  Min.  Av.  Max.  Min. 
G10, Group 1  11  84  -15  3  55  -32  -2  46  -36 
  Group 2  3  81  -23  -19  41  -58       
EU,  Group 1  6  31  -7  -4  55  -32  -6  26  -31 
  Group 2  1  81  -67  -20  41  -58       
'Other' banks  12  103  -17  4  75  -33       
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2003a. 
 
The considerable variability in the impact on individual banks is explained in Table B below, which 
highlights the contributions to the change in overall requirements deriving from different credit portfolios. 
As can be seen, the main factor contributing to falls in overall credit risk requirements is the relative size of 
the retail portfolio because of the significantly lower risk weights employed in Basel II. For each group of 
banks, however, the new capital charge levied for operational risk, varying from 8% to 15%, more than 
offsets any declines enjoyed with respect to overall credit risk requirements leading to the net positive 
overall results exhibited in Table A, column 1. 
 
Table B : % Contributions to Changes in Overall Capital Requirements from Core Portfolios under 
the Standardised Approach 
 
Portfolio Type  G10  EU  Other 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 1  Group 2   
Corporate  1  -1  -1  -1  0 
Sovereign  0  0  0  0  1 
  Bank  2  0  2  1  2 
  Retail  -5  -10  -5  -7  -4 
  SME  -1  -2  -2  -2  -1 
Securitised assets  1  0  1  0  0 
Other portfolios  2  1  2  -1  3 
Overall credit risk  0  -11  -3  -11  2 
Operational risk  10  15  8  12  11 
Overall change  11  3  6  1  12 
 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2003a. 
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•  With respect to the Foundation IRB approach, again there is wide variation in the impact on individual 
banks and groups of banks. The biggest "winners" (see Table A) are the small banks in the G10 and EU, 
the latter enjoying average falls in overall capital requirements of 20%; while the "losers" are large G10 
banks and banks from non-EU/G10 countries, both groups experiencing small average increases. As in 
the standardised approach, the relative size of the retail (especially mortgage) portfolio largely drives the 
results, although nearly all banks also enjoy significant reductions in capital requirements in respect of 
corporate exposures and loans to SMEs – see Table C. 
 
Table C :  % Contributions to Changes in Overall Capital Requirements from Core Portfolios under 
the IRB Foundation Approach 
 
Portfolio Type  G10  EU  Other 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 1  Group 2   
Corporate  -2  -4  -5  -5  -1 
Sovereign  2  0  2  1  1 
  Bank  2  -1  2  -1  1 
  Retail  -9  -17  -9  -18  -8 
  SME  -2  -4  -3  -5  1 
Securitised assets  0  -1  0  -1  1 
General provisions  -1  -3  -2  -2  -2 
Other portfolios  4  3  3  5  5 
Overall credit risk  -7  -27  -13  -27  -3 
Operational risk  10  7  9  6  7 
Overall change  3  -19  -4  -20  4 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2003a. 
 
  In terms of the incentive effects of Basel II, these results suggest that most small EU/G10 banks would 
be well advised to adopt the Foundation IRB approach rather than the standardised approach, although 
the position is less clear for banks located outside these regions. 
 
•  Finally, with respect to the Advanced IRB approach, the results contained in Table A demonstrate that 
many (large) banks in the EU and G10 would benefit from adopting the more sophisticated IRB 
approach, with average falls (of 6% and 2% respectively) in overall capital requirements resulting. As 
under the Foundation IRB approach, the main factors driving this result are the relative sizes of the 
retail, corporate and SME portfolios – see Table D. 
 
Table D :  % Contributions to Changes in Overall Capital Requirements from Core Portfolios under 
the Advanced IRB Approach 
 
Portfolio Type  G10  EU 
  Group 1  Group 1 
Corporate  -4  -4 
Sovereign  1  1 
  Bank  0  -1 
  Retail  -9  -9 
  SME  -3  -4 
Securitised assets  0  0 
General provisions  -2  -3 
Other portfolios  2  4 
Overall credit risk  -13  -15 
Operational risk  11  10 
Overall change  -2  -6 
 
Source:  Basel Committee, 2003a. 
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IMPACT ON BASEL II 
 
Having digested the results of QIS3, the Basel Committee decided to make the following changes to its 
proposed Pillar 1 capital requirements in order to enhance its ability to meet its overall reform aims and 
objectives: 
 
•  In respect of the standardised approach, a lower risk weight of 35% (previously, 40%) is to be allocated 
to residential mortgages, and "past due" loans with significant levels of specific provisioning (i.e. equal 
to at least 20% of the outstanding amount of the loan) will now enjoy a risk weight of 100% (previously, 
150%). An alternative standardised treatment for operational risk will also now be available, at national 
discretion. 
 
•  With respect to the IRB approaches, further fine-tuning has also been made. For example, floors have 
been set for retail mortgage LGDs (10%) – to apply for a 3-year transitional period following 
implementation of the IRB approaches – and for retail PDs (3 basis points), the risk weight curve for 
qualifying revolving retail exposures has been modified, and the implicit maturity for repos has been 
reduced to 6 months. Partial adoption of the AMA in respect of the calculation of the operational risk 
requirement is now also possible, and banks using this approach may now also recognise insurance as an  
operational risk mitigant when calculating regulatory capital. 
  These refined Pillar 1 requirements, together with a set of streamlined Pillar 3 disclosure requirements 
and updated guidance in respect of supervisory review (Pillar 2), constitute the components of the third 
consultation paper on 'A New Basel Capital Accord' published in April 2003 (Basel Committee, 2003b). 
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4.2   CP3 
 
 
The main Pillar 1 adjustments made to CP2 in response to QIS3 are produced in Exhibit 9. 
It is perhaps worthwhile, however, briefly indicating the refinements introduced to the 
other two pillars under CP3 (Basel Committee, 2003b; Cornford, 2004). 
 
  As indicated in Basel Committee (2001f), supervisory review (Pillar 2) is to be based 
on four  "key principles". The first of these is that, "Banks should have a process for 
assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for 
maintaining their capital levels." This requires banks to demonstrate that chosen internal 
capital targets are well founded and that these targets are consistent with their overall risk 
profile and current operating environment. In assessing capital adequacy, banks have to 
take account of the stage of the business cycle in which they are operating, and rigorous, 
forward-looking stress tests that identify possible events or changes in market conditions 
that might adversely impact upon the bank should be carried out. The term "rigorous" is 
taken  to  mean  that  there  is  board  and  senior  management  oversight,  that  the  capital 
assessment process is sound, that the assessment of risks is comprehensive, that there is an 
adequate system for monitoring and reporting risk exposures and, finally, that periodic 
reviews of internal controls are undertaken to ensure well-ordered and prudent conduct of 
business and the integrity, accuracy and reasonableness of the risk management process. 
 
  The  second  key  principle  is  that,  "Supervisors  should  review  and  evaluate  banks' 
internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and 
ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process." The emphasis of 
the periodic review should be on the quality of the banks' risk management and controls    31 
and  is  likely  to  involve  a  combination  of  the  following:  on-site  examinations  or 
inspections; off-site review; discussions with bank management; review of relevant work 
done by external auditors; and periodic reporting. 
 
  Key principle number three is that, "Supervisors should expect banks to operate above 
the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold 
capital in excess of the minimum." Despite the conservative nature of Pillar 1 capital 
requirements, which include a buffer for uncertainties that affect the banking population as 
a whole (bank-specific uncertainties have to be covered under Pillar 2), the Committee 
believes that a further buffer, over and above the Pillar 1 standard, is required for a variety 
of  reasons.  These  include,  inter  alia,  the  possibility  that,  in  unfavourable  market 
conditions, banks may find it very costly to raise additional capital. Moreover, if banks are 
not to breach minimum requirements they have to operate with a margin for manoeuvre. 
Thus, while many banks may voluntarily choose to operate above Pillar 1 minimums (e.g. 
to  gain  possible  funding  advantages  associated  with  being  well-capitalised,  and  hence 
highly-rated by rating agencies), supervisors have to possess the means to force all to do 
so. 
 
  The fourth and final key principle is that, "Supervisors should seek to intervene at an 
early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support 
the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if 
capital  is  not  maintained  or  restored."  Options  which  supervisors  can  use  to  ensure 
compliance with this principle include intensifying the monitoring of the banks, restricting 
the  payment  of  dividends,  requiring  the  errant  banks  to  prepare  and  implement  a 
satisfactory  capital  restoration  plan  and  requiring  them  to  raise  additional  capital   32 
immediately. The last-mentioned remedial option is often likely to be an interim measure 
to be used while more permanent solutions, such as improving systems and controls, are 
put in place. 
 
  Apart  from  adhering  to  these  key  principles,  supervisors  are  asked  to  focus  on  a 
number  of  important  issues  when  carrying  out  the  supervisory  review  process.  These 
include  some  key  risks,  such  as  interest  rate  risk  in  the  banking  book  and  credit 
concentration risk, which are not directly addressed by Pillar 1. Moreover, even for those 
risks which are covered by Pillar 1, there may be cause for further assessment under Pillar 
2,  e.g.  the  conduct  of  stress  tests  under  the  IRB  approaches,  the  definition  of  default 
adopted  and  the  treatment  of  residual  risks  arising  from  credit  risk  mitigation  can  all 
materially influence the adequacy of the credit risk capital charge. Similarly, the Pillar 1 
treatment  of  securitisation  may  not  adequately  take  account  of  the  risks  to  which 
individual banks are exposed. 
 
  Finally, supervisors are asked to carry out their obligations in a highly transparent and 
accountable manner, making publicly available the criteria to be used in the review of 
banks'  internal  capital  assessments.  In  this  way,  banks  can  be  reassured  about  the 
objectivity of the supervisors' chosen actions which, by their very nature, are discretionary. 
 
  With respect to the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, the Committee aims to encourage 
market  discipline  by  developing  a  set  of  disclosure  requirements  which  allow  market 
participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk 
exposures, and risk assessment processes, and thus on the capital adequacy of individual 
banks. Compliance with specific disclosure requirements will also be used as a qualifying   33 
criterion to obtain lower risk weightings and/or to apply specific methodologies under 
Pillar 1. 
 
  When  deciding  what  information  is  relevant  to  the  Pillar  3  disclosure  regime 
(disclosures are not required to be audited by external auditors unless otherwise required 
by accounting standards setters or other authorities), a bank has to base its judgement on 
the concept of "materiality". Information should be regarded as material if "its omission or 
misstatement could change or influence the assessment or decision of a user relying on 
that information" (Basel Committee, 2003b, p.155). This so-called "user test" is believed 
to provide a useful benchmark for achieving sufficient disclosure. Banks should also have 
a formal disclosure policy approved by the Board of Directors that addresses the bank's 
approach for determining what disclosures it will make and the internal controls over the 
disclosure process. In addition, banks are expected to implement a process for assessing 
the  appropriateness  of  their  disclosures,  including  validation  and  the  frequency  of 
disclosure. 
 
  As  for  the  frequency  of  disclosure,  the  Committee  generally  calls  for  semi-annual 
disclosure.  Large  internationally-active  banks  and  other  "significant"  banks  (and  their 
significant subsidiaries), however, must disclose their Tier 1 and total capital adequacy 
ratios,  and  their  components,  on  a  quarterly  basis.  Moreover,  if  information  on  risk 
exposure or other items is prone to rapid change, then banks should also disclose such 
information on a quarterly basis. In all cases, banks should publish material information as 
soon as practicable. 
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  The formal disclosure requirements set out under Pillar 3 in CP3, which were designed 
to be consistent with the broader requirements of accounting standards and believed to 
strike  an  appropriate  balance  between  the  need  for  meaningful  disclosure  and  the 
protection of proprietary and confidential information, comprise sets of qualitative and 
quantitative disclosures that banks have to make in each of the areas outlined earlier – 
scope  of  application,  capital  structure,  capital  adequacy,  risk  exposures,  and  risk 
assessment processes (distinguishing between the use of standardised approaches and IRB 
approaches). Separate regimes for credit risk mitigation and asset securitisation are also 
established. [For full details see Basel Committee, 2003b, pp.156-168.] Separate "strong 
recommendations",  as  suggested  in  CP2,  no  longer  feature  in  the  proposed  disclosure 
regime. 
 
4.3   Developments Post-"CP3" 
 
 
Following  a  meeting  held  in  Madrid  during  the  period  10-11  October  2003,  a  Press 
Release (Basel Committee, 2003c) was issued announcing that agreement in principle had 
been reached on the treatment of expected versus unexpected losses. Accordingly, the 
calibration adopted within the IRB approach (the standardised approach is not affected) to 
credit losses would be revised so that capital charges only cover unexpected losses (i.e. 
expected  losses  would  no  longer  be  covered),  with  banks'  loan  pricing  and  loan  loss 
provisioning being used to cover the expected element of losses.
5 If, when comparing the 
IRB measurement of expected losses with the total amount of provisions (general plus 
specific) held, a "shortfall" in provisions is revealed, 50 per cent has to be deducted from 
Tier 1 capital and 50 per cent from Tier 2 capital. Any "excess" can, at national discretion, 
                                                 
5 The Committee chairman claims the original approach was "intended as a practical compromise to account 
for differences in national accounting and supervisory practices regarding provisioning" (Caruana, 2003a). 
Many people see the volte face as a cave-in to the US credit card lobby.   35 
be counted as Tier 2 capital, subject to a limit (later revised – see below) of 20 per cent of 
Tier 2 capital. The new proposal also means that the current practice of including general 
provisions within Tier 2 capital will end, at least in respect of the IRB approach. 
 
  The Committee also announced that a number of issues remained to be resolved (i.e. 
the definitive treatment of expected versus unexpected losses, securitisation, credit card 
commitments and risk mitigation techniques) and these would be reviewed at a meeting to 
be held in January 2004 with a view to publishing a final and definitive version of the New 
Accord  by  mid-2004  for  implementation  by  G10  countries  by  end-2006.  Prior  to 
implementation of the New Accord, a further review of the calibration of capital charges 
will be conducted to take account of additional information that may become available 
(e.g.  as  derives  from  further  impact  assessments  in  some  jurisdictions).  Work,  post-
implementation,  will  focus  on,  inter  alia,  possible  recognition  of  portfolio  credit  risk 
models. 
 
  As foreshadowed in the Press Release of 11 October 2003, a further Press Release 
(Basel Committee, 2004b) was issued on 15 January 2004 announcing the following: 
 
•  That the proposed treatment of expected/unexpected losses within the IRB approach 
outlined  in  October  2003  will  be  adopted,  although  the  cap  on  the  recognition  of 
"excess" provisions within Tier 2 capital will be expressed as a percentage (the amount 
was confirmed as 0.6 per cent in  Basel Committee 2004a) of  credit risk-weighted 
assets and not, as originally proposed, as a percentage of Tier 2 capital. 
 
•  That, within the treatment of securitisation exposures:   36 
  (i)    banks are to be allowed to derive the risk-weights on unrated exposures to 
asset-backed  commercial  paper  conduits  (mainly  liquidity  facilities)  by 
mapping their internal risk assessments to external credit ratings; 
  (ii)   a less complex 'Supervisory Formula' will be available for determining capital 
requirements for unrated securitisation exposures; 
  (iii)  both originating and investing banks will be able to make equivalent use of the 
'Ratings-Based Approach' (RBA) for rated securitisation exposures; and 
  (iv)   the  calibration  of  the  securitisation  RBA  risk  weights  has  been  revised  to 
ensure a closer alignment with the level of risk inherent in the positions. [For 
further details see Basel Committee, 2004b, 'Attachment A'.] 
 
•  That, in respect of the treatment of credit risk mitigation techniques, the rules will be 
refined following industry comments. The Committee recognises that the treatment 
must continue to evolve to reflect industry practices and is still working to find a 
'prudentially-sound' solution. 
 
  The  Committee  also  took  the  opportunity  to  clarify  its  views  concerning  the 
implementation of the supervisory review of capital under Pillar 2. Given the differences 
in legal and regulatory structures across countries, the Committee is keen to maintain an 
adequate degree of flexibility in the application of the rules. For this reason, it deliberately 
eschews giving extensive prescriptive guidance in this area. However, it is still concerned 
to promote consistency in the implementation of Pillar 2 and to secure convergence in 
supervisory  practices  and,  accordingly,  emphasises  the  need  for  "a  combination  of 
information-sharing on supervisory practices between supervisors on the one hand and 
constructive  dialogue  between  banks  and  supervisors  on  the  other  …".  The  'Accord   37 
Implementation Group' (AIG) will work to facilitate such information exchanges and to 
secure  greater  co-operation  between  supervisors.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  however,  the 
Committee  does  not  expect  to  see  "perfect  uniformity  of  approaches  or  results  across 
national jurisdictions", not least because certain countries will choose to impose formal 
requirements in excess of those demanded under Pillar 2. 
 
  The Committee went on to re-affirm that prime responsibility for determining capital 
adequacy  resides  with  the  banks,  who  must  take  into  account  their  own  individual 
circumstances and risk exposures (including those arising outside Pillar 2, i.e. interest-rate 
risk in the banking book and credit concentration risk). The role of supervisors is to satisfy 
themselves as to the appropriateness of the banks' approaches and the adequacy of banks' 
capital and to take appropriate action in the light of any concerns that they might have in 
this regard. This is not intended to lead to specific additional, formal across-the-board 
requirements,  nor  does  Pillar  2  require  an  explicit  "add-on"  for  each  risk  element 
mentioned in the Accord. However, supervisors are required to ensure that internationally-
active banks operate above the Pillar 1 minimum requirement, although it is up to them 
how they choose to ensure this. 
 
  Finally,  in  respect  of  the  cross-border  implementation  of  Pillar  2,  the  "high  level 
principles" outlined in August 2003 (Basel Committee, 2003d) are to be adopted without 
prejudice  to  the  operation  of  the  "Basle  Concordat"  (see  Hall,  1999,  chapter  3).  [For 
further details see Basel Committee, 2004b, 'Attachment B'.] 
 
  With respect to Pillar 3, consultation post-"CP3" has focussed on three main issues: 
proprietary  versus  public  information;  principles  versus  rules;  and  consistency  with   38 
emerging  Accounting  Standards  (Caruana,  2003b).  As  regards  the  proprietary  versus 
public information debate, the Committee recognises that some information should remain 
private  but  also  emphasises  the  needs  of  end-users  (i.e.  creditors,  shareholders  and 
counterparties). The Chairman  goes on to  argue that what should drive the debate is: 
"What a bank itself would want to know before making an investment or credit decision, 
rather than the concerns that some have about what formerly had been considered secret." 
The  Committee  believes  it  has  struck  an  appropriate  balance  between  meaningful 
disclosure and the protection of proprietary and confidential information. 
 
  On the principles versus rules debate, the Chairman notes that while a principles-based 
approach would offer benefits in terms of simplicity and flexibility, the absence of specific 
rules would not ensure the consistent application of the New Accord across jurisdictions, 
and hence a level playing field; moreover, it might not provide markets with a clear view 
of a bank's risk profile. Accordingly, having rejected proposals for optional supplementary 
disclosures, the Committee decided to advocate disclosure rules based upon the following 
principles: 
  "that market participants require an understanding of how the capital requirements 
apply to the consolidated banking organisation;  
  that they should know what risks banks face, to what degree, and how they assess 
those risks; 
  and that they should have details on what capital they hold". 
Compliance with these principles requires that "banks should have a formal disclosure 
policy approved by the Board, that internal measurement tools must be credible, that they 
must  adequately  capture  risk,  and  that  they  must  be  used  by  banks  in  the  daily 
management of their operations and not just for regulatory purposes". The Committee   39 
recognises  their  principles-based  disclosure  rules  are  more  detailed  than  some  banks 
wanted, but they were determined not to base them on a set of looser principles which 
might be subject to local interpretation. 
 
  Thirdly,  as  regards  the  consistency  of  the  disclosure  requirements  with  emerging 
Accounting Standards, the Chairman argues that the Pillar 3 requirements should be seen 
as a "further refinement of accounting standards requirements as they should apply to 
banks in the light of the specific risks they face". The Committee, nevertheless, is keen to 
ensure that its requirements do not conflict with broader accounting standards and, to that 
end, has liased closely with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Where 
regulatory and accounting principles may not yet be fully consistent, the Committee "has 
sought to align its requirements as best as possible with international accounting standards 
and to resolve other matters reasonably and based on its understanding of the potential 
direction that accounting standards might take in the future". The Committee will continue 
to monitor its Pillar 3 requirements in the light of accounting and market developments. 
 
  The final piece of the jigsaw fell into place with the announcement, on 11 May 2004, 
by the Committee that  "consensus had been reached on  all outstanding issues
6 (Basel 
Committee, 2004c). The Committee also confirmed that the text of the new international 
capital standard would be published by end-June 2004, as previously intended, although 
                                                 
6 The technical issues resolved related to specification of a treatment for revolving retail exposure, and 
related securitised portfolios, and agreement on the measurements required for LGD parameters by banks 
adopting an IRB approach to credit risk. In connection with the latter, the Committee's concern, as explained 
in CP3, was that banks need to take into account the potential for loss rates to be higher than average when 
borrowers default during an economic downturn when assigning LGDs, particularly for exposures where it 
could make a material difference. Subsequent discussions with the banking industry indicated both that the 
importance of this issue varies across exposure types and that individual banks do not have highly-developed 
approaches to assess this risk. The Committee remains of the view that each bank should assign a single 
LGD  that  reflects  "economic  downturn"  conditions  where  necessary  to  capture  the  relevant  risk.  The 
Committee is looking to further industry input and dialogue to ensure that appropriate economic downturn 
LGDs are applied where necessary. Whilst such a consensus is being reached, the Committee canvasses the 
idea of banks using their internal LGD processes to derive "expected" LGDs for each category of exposure.   40 
implementation of the advanced IRB approach would be delayed until end-2007 to allow 
for  further  study  of  its  impact  and  the  development  of  a  consistent  approach  to  its 
implementation by supervisors and the banking industry. The rest of Basel II has to be 
adopted by G10 banks by end-2006, as planned. The Committee also stated that there was 
a  need  for  a  further  review  of  the  'calibration'  of  the  new  framework  prior  to  its 
implementation in order to ensure that the objective of broadly maintaining the aggregate 
level of required bank capital whilst providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-
sensitive approaches of the new framework were satisfied. If the former goal is threatened, 
the Committee reserves the right to apply a single scaling factor, which could be greater 
than  or  less  than  one  (the  current  "best  estimate"  is  1.06),  to  the  results  of  the  new 
framework. The final determination of any scaling factor will be based on the "parallel 
running"
7  results,  which  will  reflect  all  of  the  elements  of  the  framework  to  be 
implemented. 
 
  In addition to the above, the Committee also took the opportunity to elaborate further 
on the principles and issues associated with cross-border implementation of Basel II. The 
Committee believes that closer co-ordination and co-operation between home and host 
supervisors is essential if the New Accord is to be implemented effectively and efficiently 
and  at  minimum  cost  to  the  banking  industry.  Accordingly,  the  AIG  is  charged  with 
identifying and coming up with ways of handling the practical implications of countries 
adopting  the  "high  level  principles"  set  out  in  August  2003  (see  p.37  above). 
                                                 
7 For those banks adopting the foundation IRB approach to credit risk, the standardised approach will run 
alongside  the  new  approach  for  one  year,  i.e.  during  2006.  A  capital  floor  of  95  per  cent  of  Basel  I 
standardised minimum requirements (after allowing for the new treatment of provisions explained on pp.33-
34 of this article) will apply in 2007, with floors of 90 per cent and 80 per cent operating during 2008 and 
2009 respectively. For those banks moving directly from the existing framework to the advanced approaches 
to credit and operational risk, there will be two years of parallel running/impact studies – during 2006 and 
2007. As for foundation IRB banks, capital floors of 90 per cent and 80 per cent of Basel I standardised 
requirements will operate in 2008 and 2009 respectively.   41 
Notwithstanding this, the Committee has clarified its own views on a number of related 
issues, stressing that the co-ordination effort be led by home country supervisors. For 
example, in the co-ordination of requests for information, the Committee asserts that if 
host country supervisors need information about foreign subsidiaries operating in their 
jurisdictions, the first port of call should be the home country supervisors and not the 
banks  themselves  (although  this  does  not  preclude  host  country  discussions  about 
prudential matters with the banks direct). Similarly, in the approval and validation work 
necessitated  by  Basel  II,  the  Committee  expects    the  initial  validation  work  for  most 
advanced IRB approaches for larger corporate exposures to be led by the home country, 
with appropriate input from the host country supervisor and material  reliance by  host 
countries on the work of the home regulator. And finally,
8 with respect to the practical 
considerations involved in the recognition of AMA operational risk capital across borders 
(a  technical  note  on  which  was  first  issued  in  January  2004  –  see  Basel  Committee, 
2004d),  the  Committee  argues  that,  "As  a  general  rule,  where  a  banking  organisation 
wishes (or is required) to adopt an AMA at both the group-wide and subsidiary levels … it 
would be beneficial for the supervisory assessment of the AMA models to be co-ordinated 
by the home supervisors …" and "desirable for the home supervisor to receive a banking 
organisation's  AMA  submission  and  co-ordinate  comments  from  host  supervisors  in 
jurisdictions where the AMA will be applied" (Basel Committee, 2004c, p.9). However, 
both home and host supervisors are expected to co-operate in both the initial validation of 
an  AMA  and  on-going  monitoring  of  a  banking  organisation's  operational  risk 
management. Moreover, host supervisors will still need to be assured that the board and 
senior  management  of  a  subsidiary  bank  understand  the  subsidiary's  operational  risk 
profile,  including  how  its  operational  risks  are  managed,  and  approve  its  Pillar  1 
                                                 
8 "Partial use" rules, the ability to leverage group resources, and "use tests" are also further elaborated upon 
in the Press Release of 11 May 2004.   42 
methodology  for  determining  its  operational  risk  capital  requirements,  whether  that 
methodology comprises a stand-alone AMA or an allocation mechanism.
9 
                                                 
9 The Committee has shied away from defining the term "significant" used in its publication of January 2004 
(Basel Committee, 2004d) and hence from determining ineligibility for an "approved allocation mechanism". 
It is thus left to home and host supervisors to work together to determine which internationally- active 
subsidiaries can reasonably be deemed to be "significant" and hence must adopt stand-alone AMAs.   43 





The revised framework for assessing the capital adequacy of internationally-active banks – 
Basel II – was finally endorsed by the G10 bank supervisors on 26 June 2004 (Basel 
Committee, 2004a). It incorporated all the changes alluded to in Section 4 of this article 
plus  a  revised  treatment  of  credit  risk  mitigation  and  of  qualifying  revolving  retail 
exposures (see paras 109-210 and 329 respectively of Basel Committee, 2004a). Of the 
239 pages, 146 are devoted to Pillar 1 requirements, with 17 being devoted to Pillar 2 
requirements and 16 to Pillar 3. With respect to the Pillar 2 requirements, the supervisory 
review process is based around the same four "key principles" outlined in section 4.2 
above; and the disclosure requirements established under Pillar 3 cover the same areas 
noted in section 4.2 above. 
 
  As for the future, the Basel Committee intends to monitor and review the application 
of the new framework with a view to achieving greater consistency in application, and to 
revise it where necessary to accommodate market developments and further advances in 
risk  management  practices.  It  is  also,  in  a  consultation  with  IOSCO,  reviewing  the 
regulatory  treatment  of  banks'  trading  book  operations.  Longer-term,  the  Committee 
proposes to look again at the definition of eligible capital; and dialogue with the banking 
industry will continue concerning the possible future recognition of portfolio credit risk 
models.   44 





Despite the best endeavours of the Committee over the last few  years there is still a, 
perhaps  surprisingly-large,  body  of  opinion  opposing  the  introduction  of  Basel  II,  as 
presently  constituted.  This  traverses  all  relevant  sectors  to  embrace  the  supervisory 
fraternity, the banking industry, the political arena, and academia. What is the rationale 
behind this strength and depth of opposition? 
 
  Academic commentators, whilst typically acknowledging the benefits of Basel II over 
Basel I – as outlined in Exhibit 6, as subsequently amended
10 - emphasise the residual 
flaws in the agreed approach and criticise the Committee for not doing a wider cost-
benefit analysis of alternative approaches. In respect of the remaining flaws in Basel II, the 
main outstanding concerns relate to: 
•  the retention of the flawed standardised risk assessment methodology which ignores 
risk correlations (even though a more risk-sensitive framework, embracing external 
credit assessments, is to be applied); 
•  persisting disagreement over the risk assessment of certain credits (many view the 
treatment of securitisation as punitive, and the treatment of residential property loans 
and commercial lending as lenient); 
                                                 
10 For example, as noted in Hall (2001a), the CP2 set of proposals represented a significant advance on CP1 
because  of  the  increased  cost-effectiveness  likely  to  result  from,  inter  alia,  the  increased  choice  of 
assessment approaches offered to a much wider range of banks than previously envisaged, the promulgation 
of a more risk-sensitive standardised approach, the additional safeguards built into the use of external credit 
assessments and internal assessments (under the IRB approaches), the new IRB framework for credit risk 
explicitly  recognising  more  elements  of  credit  risk  in  the  regulatory  capital  calculation,  the  increased 
financial  stability  induced  by  the  extension  of  the  supervisory  review  process,  the  enhanced  market 
discipline deriving from the adoption of a much broader range of disclosure requirements, and the attempts 
made to lighten the overall compliance burden for banks and supervisors alike.   45 
•  the failure to address, satisfactorily, the pro-cyclical impact of the reform package, 
which  risks  amplifying  business  cycles  (although  bankers  are  now  being  asked  to 
assess  the  riskiness  of  the  loans  over  the  full  economic  cycle  under  a  Pillar  2 
requirement  that  demands  "meaningfully  conservative  credit  risk  stress  testing"  by 
banks adopting the IRB approaches);
11 
•  given the continuing doubts about the current "state of the art" in credit risk modelling 
and the lack of historical data on loan defaults, the real risks to "safety and soundness" 
if banks are given, prematurely, supervisory recognition of their IRB approaches and, 
further down the round, their portfolio credit risk models (there is a real possibility 
that, in some jurisdictions, the banks will be able to "browbeat" their supervisors into 
granting  supervisory  recognition  of  their  models  in  circumstances  where  a  more 
cautious approach would be advisable); 
•  the scale of the supervisory burden that will be faced in all jurisdictions, but especially 
in developing countries, which risks undermining the effectiveness of the proposals; 
•  continuing doubts about the wisdom of embracing external credit assessments within 
the assessment regime (for some, the safeguards designed to ensure the public interest 
prevails in instances where external credit assessments are embraced do not go far 
enough;
12  while  others  continue  to  question  the  accuracy  of  the  credit  assessment 
                                                 
11 A more sanguine view is held by HM Treasury, which argues that a combination of the Pillar 2 stress tests, 
the flattening of the IRB curves and induced improvements in risk management will reduce the extent of 
procyclicality (HM Treasury, 2003). Caterineu-Abel et al. (2003), however, demonstrate that the extent of 
procyclicality under Basel II, at least in respect of lending to corporates, depends crucially on the banks' 
choice of rating system; use of the external ratings-based standardised approach or an IRB approach based 
on such an approach is associated with little procyclicality, whereas use of an IRB approach based on a 
Merton-type  model  would  produce  considerable  procyclicality,  leading  to  "overlending"  in  booms  and 
"underlending" in recessions as a result of significant changes in capital requirements. Moreover, banks are 
shown to have a clear financial incentive (i.e. higher profits over the cycle) to adopt procyclical ratings 
rather than a rating approach which delivered more stability over the cycle. [For further contributions on the 
procyclicality debate see Allen and Saunders (2003), Ayuso et al. (2002), Ervin and Wilde (2001) and Lowe 
(2003).] 
12 Concerns about potential conflicts of interest facing the rating agencies have heightened since the growth 
in sales of bespoke risk management systems to their banking clients has become apparent. This and other 
issues have sparked a review of the credit rating industry by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the   46 
ratings  produced  by  the  rating  agencies,  the  collapse  of  the  Italian  dairy  group, 
Parmalat, in 2003 being the latest in a long list of high profile corporate failures that 
the agencies failed to pick up on); 
•  concerns that, in connection with the credit calibration process, the correct balance has 
not  been  struck  between,  on  the  one  hand,  encouraging  the  take-up  of  the  IRB 
approaches and, on the other, ensuring "safety and soundness"; 
•  the Committee's determination to treat operational risk under Pillar 1 rather than Pillar 
2; 
•  the  fear  that,  given  the  dramatic  increase  in  the  scope  for  national  discretion 
(apparently, there are 85 opt-out clauses in the new agreement), the quest for a level 
regulatory laying field will be seriously undermined, an objective already threatened 
by the variability in the quality of national supervision (to allay such fears the Basel 
Committee  has  set  up  the  'Accord  Implementation  Group'  to  try  to  ensure  a  high 
degree of consistency in implementation);  and 
•  the  Committee's  determination  to  secure  endorsement  of  its  proposals  by  all  G10 
countries,  which  has  led  to  unfortunate  compromises  on  principle,  which  risk 
undermining both the spirit and the impact of the reform package. 
 
  With regard to the Committee's failure to conduct a wider cost-benefit analysis of 
competing  approaches  to  capital  adequacy  assessment,  the  following  are  the  leading 
contenders for adoption: the pre-commitment approach (developed by  Federal Reserve 
economists);  a  mandatory  subordinated  debt  requirement  (the  option  preferred  by  the 
                                                                                                                                                   
US which is likely to result in clarification of the criteria used in the US to award "nationally recognised 
statistical  ratings  organisations"  (NRSRO)  status,  the  imposition  of  record-keeping  and  reporting 
requirements on rating agencies and closer examination of the rating agencies' approaches used to assess 
creditworthiness. The first of these outcomes would serve to stimulate competition in the industry, currently 
comprising only four firms in the US – Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's, Fitch Ratings and the 
Dominion Bond Rating Service.   47 
Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee,  e.g.  see  US  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory 
Committee,  2000);  a  less  prescriptive  and  more  market-based  approach  (i.e.  with  less 
emphasis on Pillar 1 requirements and more on Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 requirements); and a 
fully-fledged market-based approach (i.e. laissez-faire). The second and third options, in 
particular, have found favour in many quarters recently, especially amongst the proponents 
of enhanced market discipline, the majority of whom view it as being a complement to 
(rather than, as the laissez-faire school argues, a substitute for) a system of sound banking 
regulation and supervision. [The other two options are addressed in more detail in Hall, 
2001b.] For this reason, further discussion is merited here. 
 
  The general criticism made by the proponents of enhanced market discipline of Basel 
II is that it does not go far enough. As a result, they argue, the Committee has missed a 
golden opportunity to strengthen prudential regulation and supervision by, for example, 
linking  it  to  supervisory  actions
13  (Herring,  2003).  Whilst  increased  information 
disclosure,  effected  through  the  Pillar  3  requirements,  is  a  necessary  component  of 
enhanced  market  discipline,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  induce  effective  market  discipline, 
whereby stakeholders take actions to both monitor and influence the behaviour of market 
borrowers (see Hall, Hamaleinen and Howcroft, 2003 and 2004). The proposal for the 
operation  of  a  mandatory  subordinated  debt  requirement,  at  least  within  financially-
developed countries,
14 is viewed in this context as a device for inducing effective market 
discipline by creating a large pool of "at risk" (i.e. "credibly uninsured") bank creditors, 
who clearly would have a financial incentive to at least try to monitor and influence the 
bank issuers' behaviour (Kaufman, 2003; US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 
                                                 
13 For example, "prompt corrective action"-type measures, as currently operated in the US, could be linked, 
there and elsewhere, to movements in the yields on banks' subordinated debt. 
14 Although the Basel Committee (Basel Committee, 2003e) commissioned a review of the markets for bank 
subordinated debt in Member Countries, it has not promoted a mandatory subordinated debt requirement as 
part of its capital adequacy assessment regime.   48 
2000). Such a development would help to weaken belief in the "too-big-to-fail" doctrine, a 
perception which still predominates in most countries, at least outside the US,
15 and which 
has done so much to undermine market discipline. 
 
  As regards the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements themselves, there clearly is a need for 
enhanced  information  disclosure
16  but  what  constitutes  the  optimal  disclosure  regime 
(Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  2002)?  Apart  from  the  need  to 
minimise the cost burden borne by the banking industry,
17 there is also a need to limit the 
volume  of  disclosures  to  manageable  levels  so  that  analysts  and  investors  are  not 
overloaded  with  information  which  may  be  misconstrued  (Institute  for  International 
Finance, 2003). 
 
  Some insight into the usefulness of information disclosure has been provided by the 
empirical study of Baumann and Erlend (2003). They found that greater disclosure may 
not only increase the usefulness of company accounts in predicting valuations, and hence 
could be of immense benefit to market participants, but that it could also decrease stock 
price volatility
18 (and hence the cost of capital for firms) and increase market valuations, 
thereby  benefiting  the  banks  themselves.  In  addition,  they  identified  those  items  of 
disclosure  which  are  most  beneficial  to  the  banks  on  the  one  hand  and  to  market 
participants on the other. In respect of the former, the disclosure of non-interest income is 
shown to be the most important factor in decreasing stock returns volatility, although other 
                                                 
15 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 was designed, in part, to combat 
this problem. 
16  The  Committee's  earlier  disclosure  surveys  (Basel  Committee,  2002c  and  2003f)  revealed  serious 
omissions and a lack of consistency in the banks' chosen disclosures. 
17 Schaffer (1995) distinguishes the direct costs of collecting, processing and disseminating the information 
not used by management from the indirect costs that might arise should a bank's competitors be enabled to 
exploit the information the bank is forced to provide to the market. 
18 This is because of a possible reduction in investor uncertainty and in adverse selection problems.   49 
important  items  identified  are  information  disclosure  on  off-balance-sheet  items, 
contingent liabilities, long-term funding and deposits by type of customer. In terms of 
increasing  market  valuation,  disclosures  on  the  banks'  loan  structure  (by  type  and  by 
counterparty and the percentage of problem problems) as well as on the securities held (by 
purpose)  were  shown  to  have  the  strongest  effects.  And,  with  regard  to  the  potential 
benefits  to  be  reaped  by  market  participants,  they  showed  that  disclosures  on  loan 
structure,  funding  structure,  securities  holdings  and  loan  loss  provisions  had  the  most 
powerful  effects.  Finally,  they  noted  the  advantage  of  forcing  banks  to  disclose  more 
information on asset risk (e.g. relating to the composition of loans and other assets) as, 
collectively,  banks  in  a  particular  country  would  benefit  from  such  a  move  yet, 
individually, would not be rewarded for making such disclosures. 
 
  As  for  the  optimality  of  the  Committee's  chosen  disclosure  regime,  while  the 
significant  increase  in  the  range  and  quantity  of  required  disclosure  is  typically 
applauded,
19 a number of concerns remain. Herring (2003), for example, points to the 
following problems: (i) the likely variability in enforcement that will ensue which will do 
little to reduce variability in the quality of disclosures across countries, which currently 
results  from  national  differences  in  accounting  regimes  and  provisioning  policies;  (ii) 
some risk-relevant data (e.g. the currency breakdown of assets and liabilities, exposures to 
sovereign borrowers and real estate exposures) has been omitted from the list of required 
disclosures; (iii) the comparability of capital adequacy across institutions is impaired by 
the freedoms (via the "national discretions" and options available) granted under Pillar 1; 
and (iv) only limited progress has been made to date in improving the disclosure of market 
                                                 
19 These relate, in particular, to the scope of capital requirements at the holding company level, the terms and 
conditions of capital instruments used, the exposures incurred in respect of credit, market, operational and 
interest rate risk and, for banks allowed to adopt the IRB approaches, details on the inputs used within their 
models.   50 
risk  exposures  and  details  about  the  assessment  models  used,  thereby  frustrating 
meaningful comparison across both institutions and countries (see also Basel Committee, 
2002). 
 
  Notwithstanding  the  apparent  benefits  of  an  assessment  regime  that  more  fully 
embraces market discipline, however, it should be realised that each competing alternative 
regime would be associated with its own attendant costs and benefits, so that even if the 
political will existed to halt or abandon the Basel II bandwagon, it is unclear what the 
preferred strategy should be. Moreover, the "theory of the second best" highlights the 
danger of assuming that continued progress towards the "first best" solution – a regime 
which  perfectly  corrects  for  market  failure  –  will  ultimately  deliver  increased  social 
welfare, let alone maximise social welfare. 
 
  Finally,  if  one  moves  away  from  the  more  arcane  arguments  of  academics,  one 
becomes  aware  of  the  major  worries  of  those  parties  directly  affected  by  the  agreed 
proposals. The supervisors, in particular, worry about the resource burden implied by the 
movement to Basel II; the bankers argue passionately about the compliance burden they 
face, the "capping" of the short-term benefits to be derived from movement to an IRB 
approach (e.g. for those banks adopting advanced approaches for measuring credit and/or 
operational risk, the associated capital charges cannot fall below 90 per cent of the Basel I  
standardised minimum requirements in 2008 or below 80 per cent in 2009, and the floors 
may be kept in place beyond 2009 "if necessary" – Basel Committee, 2004a, para.48) and 
the  competitive  inequalities  they  will  most  likely  face  due  to  national  differences  in 
interpretation, application and enforcement; and governments (especially in developing 
countries) worry about the possible short-term adverse consequences for their banking   51 
systems  and  economies  –  China  and  India  have  already  ruled  out  participation  in  the 
foreseeable future and even the US Congress, notwithstanding the fact that only a dozen or 
so US banks will be  required to comply with  Basel  II, has voiced concern  about the 
potential  disadvantages  faced  by  small  banks  and  the  resultant  pressures  likely  to  be 
created for an acceleration in the process of concentration in the US banking industry. 
Further analysis of these and other concerns may yet delay implementation of Basel II in 
the US beyond the target date of end-2006.   52 





The Basel Committee is to be congratulated for, finally, moving to address some of the 
long-standing flaws inherent in the original Capital Accord. Similarly, by responding in 
such a positive fashion to some of the criticisms levelled at it during the various rounds of 
consultation, the definitive version of Basel II is, on balance, likely to prove more cost-
effective  than  the  packages  proposed  under  CP1,  CP2  and  CP3.  This does  not  mean, 
however, that the agreed reform package is without fault; a number of potentially-serious 
concerns remain. There is also still a widespread feeling (Rochet, 2003; Décamps et al., 
2004) that too much of the Committee's time has been devoted to refining the Pillar 1 
capital  requirements,  but  to  no  great  effect:  despite  the  complexity  of  the  new  rules, 
especially for the relatively-small number of banks adopting the IRB approaches, they are 
still likely to be easily circumvented by large, sophisticated banks if there remains an 
incentive to do so; the mapping of the rating agencies' credit ratings to the risk weights 
employed within the new standardised approach to credit risk is unlikely to eliminate the 
banks' incentive to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage, and so will result in all the 
resource  misallocations  associated  with  Basel  I;  the  failure  to  take  account  of  risk 
correlations within the standardised approach will further distort bank risk management 
practice;  and  the  continued  heavy  reliance  on  book  accounting  risks  undermining  the 
Committee's attempts to secure both its stability and, by virtue of the variability in national 
accounting conventions, competitive equality objectives (Kaufman, 2003). 
 
  Nor does the criticism stop with Pillar 1. Somewhat ironically, many who argue for 
less  prescription  in  Pillar  1  want  the  opposite  in  Pillar  2.  That  is,  they  call  upon  the 
Committee  to  clarify  the  nature  of  the  early  supervisory  intervention  clearly  expected   53 
under Pillar 2, to spell out precisely how national supervisors are to secure the objective of 
'supervisory review', and to ensure that they are given sufficient powers to do the job so 
that greater convergence in supervisory practice across countries will actually materialise, 
with concomitant benefits for both the stability and level playing field objectives. Little 
faith is put in the AIG's ability to deliver on this front. Finally, as noted in Section 6, the 
Pillar 3 requirements have also been criticised. Moreover, the Committee is berated for not 
doing more to promote the wider use of market discipline, as an integral part of prudential 
regulation and supervision. 
 
  Notwithstanding these on-going concerns and the fact that relatively-few banks around 
the world will actually be required to comply with Basel II,
20 much of value has come out 
of the Basel II process. First and foremost, the cause of sound risk management within the 
banking  industry  has  been  furthered,  to  the  benefit  of  the  banks  themselves,  their 
customers and the wider community given the knock-on effects for financial stability. 
Secondly, bank supervisors around the world are being pressured into adopting the "best 
practices"  pursued  by  their  more  advanced  contemporaries,  requiring  a  more  intimate 
knowledge of each of their bank's practices, policies, systems and controls. Again, this can 
only be good for global financial stability. And finally, the Committee, through its Pillar 3 
requirements for enhanced information disclosure, has stimulated discussion of the wider 
benefits of market discipline. It remains to be seen, however, if this leads, eventually, to its 
broader embrace by bank regulators and supervisors, as many desire. 
                                                 
20 As noted earlier, the US authorities have indicated that only a dozen or so of their largest internationally-
active banks (but covering around 99 per cent of US international banking assets) will be required to comply 
with Basel II, with perhaps another 10 or so doing so voluntarily. Moreover, China and India have opted out 
for the foreseeable future, despite the fact that they are not formally required to comply given that they are 
not G10 members. And, as for Basel I, only "internationally-active" banks are formally required to comply 
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